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 My Understanding of NRC’s Defense-in-Depth 
Philosophy (Anchor Point)
• Defense-in-depth is a basic element of the NRC’s safety philosophy
• No single definition exists, but a review of the literature conveys a 
general consensus:*
– The defense-in-depth philosophy is a balance among accident 
prevention, accident mitigation, and the limitation of the 
consequences of an accident
– Briefly stated, this philosophy
• requires high quality in the design, construction, and operation of nuclear 
plants to reduce the likelihood of malfunctions in the first instance
• recognizes that equipment can fail and operators can make mistakes, thus 
requiring safety systems to reduce the chances that malfunctions will lead to 
accidents that release fission products from the fuel
• recognizes that, in spite of these precautions, serious fuel damage accidents 
can happen, thus requiring containment structures and other safety features to 
prevent the release of fission products off site
– In the defense-in-depth philosophy, the Commission recognizes 
that complete reliance for safety cannot be placed on any single 
element of the design, maintenance, or operation of a nuclear power 
plant.
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 My Understanding of NRC’s Motivations for
Defense-in-Depth: Uncertainty
• NRC statements make it clear that the driving motivation for      
defense-in-depth is to compensate for uncertainty:*
– Uncertainty due to lack of operational experience with new 
technologies and new design features, uncertainty in the type and 
magnitude of challenges to safety
– Uncertainty and incompleteness in the knowledge of accident 
initiation and progression 
– Uncertainties in knowledge of plant behavior, component reliability, 
or operator performance that might compromise safety 
– Recognized lack of knowledge of nuclear reactor operations and the 
consequences of potential accidents 
– Unquantified and unquantifiable uncertainty in engineering 
analyses
– Inadequacies, incompleteness, and omissions of risk analyses
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 An Agency-Level Perspective
• “Defense-in-depth” is not in NASA’s lexicon
• However, managing uncertainty is fundamental to NASA’s mission
• At the Agency level, managing uncertainty is about more than the 
important task of developing, building, and operating safe systems
• It’s also about:
– Defining what constitutes adequate safety: How safe is safe enough?
• Public (range, deorbit)
• Crew (Probability of Loss of Crew (P(LOC)))
• Environment (Earth environment, planetary protection)
• Mission (Probability of Loss of Mission (P(LOM)))
– Establishing policies, requirements, standards, and guidance that 
result in adequate safety
– Making informed risk acceptance decisions
• Understanding the risks
• Understanding the uncertainties
• Deciding whether or not the probability that the risk exceeds 
expectations/requirements is within the Agency’s risk tolerances
- Low risk tolerance for public safety
- Necessarily higher risk tolerance for crew, asset safety
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 NASA’s Unique Challenges
• Spaceflight is an inherently high-risk endeavor
– Launch vehicle mission failure risk is currently in the ~10-2
rough-order-of-magnitude (ROM) range; in-space and 
reentry risks are also significant
– Bottom line: Spaceflight requires risk takers to assume 
significant risk, which necessitates relatively high risk-
tolerances in the pursuit of NASA’s mission
• Putting mass in orbit is expensive
– Safety systems and design conservatisms that involve 
significant mass increases can be prohibitively expensive
– Spaceflight safety margins are necessarily thin
• One-of-a-kind missions
– Actual risks are typically not accurately knowable
• Increasingly performance-based acquisition models
– Relatively few system-level performance requirements are 
levied (e.g., P(LOC), P(LOM)), rather than relatively many 
deterministic (proxy) requirements (e.g., failure tolerance)
– Safety is “non-observable,” so system-level requirements 
must be V&V’d by other means in order to develop 
confidence that safety performance is (or will be) met
• Commercial orbital transportation service acquisition
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 How Safe Is Safe Enough?
• The trigger for dealing with the issue of “adequate safety” was the 
NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) Recommendation 2009-
01-02a: 
– “The ASAP recommends that NASA stipulate directly the acceptable risk levels—
including confidence intervals for the various categories of activities (e.g., cargo 
flights, human flights)—to guide managers and engineers in evaluating “how safe 
is safe enough.” 
• NASA accepted the ASAP recommendation and committed to 
establishing safety thresholds and goals for human space flight 
– Safety threshold expresses an initial minimum tolerable level of safety
– Safety goal expresses expectations about the safety growth of the system in 
the long term
• Additionally, because of spaceflight’s high risk, NASA also recognized 
an ethical obligation to pursue safety improvements wherever 
practicable
– In other words, NASA systems should be As Safe As Reasonably 
Practicable (ASARP)
– The ASARP principle applies regardless of meeting safety thresholds and 
goals
• Threshold and goal values, as well as the level of ASARP application, 
are a function of risk tolerances 7
 Adequate Safety
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Adequate Safety
Meeting Minimum Levels 
of Safety
Being ASARP
• Establish safety thresholds, safety 
goals, safety growth profiles
• Establish safety performance 
margins to account for UU risk
• Levy safety performance 
requirements and associated 
verification procedures (e.g., PRA, 
tests)
• Conduct verifications
• Analyze a range of alternatives during major design, product realization, operations and 
sustainment decisions (i.e., risk-informed decision making (RIDM))
• Prioritize safety during decision making
• Implement design-for-safety strategies (e.g., hazard elimination, hazard control (e.g., 
Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR)), failure tolerance (e.g., redundancy/diversity), safing, 
emergency operations)
• Analyze and test (e.g., Hazard Analysis, Failure Modes & Effects Analysis and Critical 
Items List, PRA, qualification/acceptance testing)
• Monitor and respond to performance (e.g., precursor analysis, Problem Reporting and 
Corrective Action (PRACA), closed-loop risk management)
• Adhere to appropriate codes and standards
• Etc.
 Risk Analysis Completeness
• Safety goals and thresholds represent expectations about actual risk, 
from both known and unknown/underappreciated (UU) sources
– Known sources of risk are amenable to explicit quantification via 
synthetic, scenario-based methods of analysis (e.g., PRA), and actuarial 
methods (when sufficient data are available).
– UU sources of risk are not amenable to synthetic analysis or direct 
actuarial characterization, yet are historically recognized as significant 
contributors to risk.
• Tend to remain latent in the 
system until revealed by 
operational failures, 
precursor analysis, etc.
• Tend to be most significant 
early in the system life 
cycle.
• Disproportionally reflect 
design flaws, 
organizational issues,
and subsystem 
interactions. GapQuantified Risk
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The Shuttle Risk Analysis Gap in Retrospect
10
 Safety Performance Margin
• One approach to accounting for the contribution of UU risk is to 
determine an appropriate safety performance margin, analogous to 
other types of margin (mass, cost, etc.), between the minimum 
tolerable levels of safety performance and the levied, verifiable (e.g., 
via PRA) safety performance requirements
• The safety requirements 
tighten over a defined 
timeframe in a manner 
consistent with 
operational learning and 
stakeholder expectations 
regarding the goal
• This provides a defined 
benchmark for scoping 
and assessing safety 
improvement efforts 
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 • In order to be adequately informed, risk acceptance decision-making 
must go beyond the risk analysis
• A holistic “case” must be made that the system is adequately safe
– Substantiation that UU risks are adequately managed via application 
of the ASARP principle:
• Minimize the presence of UU scenarios (e.g., via margin, programmatic 
commitments)
• Maximize discovery of UU hazards (e.g., via testing, liberal instrumentation, 
monitoring, and trending, anomaly investigation, Precursor Analysis, use of 
best safety analysis techniques)
• Provide broad-coverage safety features (e.g., abort capability, safe haven, 
rescue)
– Substantiation that the known risk (calculated by PRA) is within the 
specified safety performance requirement
• Known risks are managed by applying controls that are designed to mitigate 
identified accident scenarios
Informed Risk Acceptance Decision-Making
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 The Risk-Informed Safety Case (RISC)
• The Risk-Informed Safety Case (RISC) is a coherent and evidentiary 
statement of how safe we are (or will be) at a given stage of the life 
cycle
• RISC is a specialization of the “safety case” construct. The term “risk-
informed” is used to emphasize that adequate safety is the result of a 
deliberative decision making process that involves an assessment of 
risks, and strives for a proper balance between safety and performance 
in other mission execution domains.
• The RISC is the totality of the “uncertainty story” about the actual 
safety performance of the system
– Presented and defended by the provider at key decision points 
– Involves serious consideration of things that live outside traditional risk models 
(e.g., organizational and management factors)
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 Mapping into Defense-in-Depth
• Defense-in-depth is not a part of NASA’s lexicon, nor is it an explicit 
element of the NASA system safety framework
• Operationally, NASA employs a range of safety strategies that maps into 
defense-in-depth
– Prevention: QA, testing, training, certification, lifecycle reviews, anomaly resolution, 
margins (where practicable), V&V, hazard/risk analysis, etc.
– Fault management: Redundancy/diversity, Integrated Vehicle Health Management 
(IVHM), safe modes, etc.
– Accident mitigation: Abort systems, flight termination systems, redundancy/diversity 
(campaign/program-level, e.g., International Space Station (ISS) resupply)
• The ASARP principle:
– Is an ethical response to the high-risk nature of spaceflight, rather than a principle of 
distributed reliance
– However, ASARP does imply defense-in-depth (i.e., prevention, fault management, 
accident mitigation) operationally
• The RISC goes beyond traditional system-centric risk analysis to address 
the totality of the “uncertainty story” about the actual safety performance 
of the system
– Quality of models, qualifications/experience of people, management and organizational 
factors, etc. 14
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 Meeting or Exceeding a Minimum Tolerable
Level of Safety
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• Minimums may be applied to any safety performance measure, e.g., 
Probability of Loss of Crew (P(LOC)), Probability of Loss of Mission 
(P(LOM)), Probability of Loss of Vehicle (P(LOV)), Expected 
Casualty (Ec).
 As Safe As Reasonably Practicable (ASARP)
• ASARP reflects a mindset of continuous safety improvement 
regardless of the current level of safety.
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 NASA System Safety Handbook Vols. 1 & 2
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• Presents an objectives-driven system 
safety framework:
– Safety requirements setting
– Safety ensurance
• Responsibility of the organization 
providing the system/service
• Active participation in designing for 
safety and in the reduction or 
elimination of risks
• Produces the RISC
– Safety assurance
• Responsibility of the organization 
acquiring the system/service
• Evaluates the RISC to support risk 
acceptance decisions
– Risk acceptance
• Decision whether to accept the risk
• Responsibility of the organization 
acquiring the system/service
 NASA System Safety Framework
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